Abstract: Many previous event studies have found unexpectedly large losses to firms involved in negative incidents. Many of these studies' authors explain such losses as "goodwill losses" or "reputation effects." To test this hypothesis, we search for residual losses (in excess of direct costs) to firms involved in events which produce ill will, but do not affect the quality of their final products nor break implicit labor or supply contracts. We find an overall insignificant capital market response to a sample of 98 negative environmental events (representing all such incidents reported in the Wall Street Journal between 1970 and 1992 in which electric power companies or oil firms with listed stocks were involved). Although others have found similar outcomes for more limited samples, our results enhance previous research by extending similar findings to a broader range of environmental incidents over a longer time period. Further, our findings suggest that the large residual losses of other studies may be due to reputation (and not measurement errors or event study idiosyncrasies), but only when the notion of "reputation effects" is limited to punishment solely by those who are directly harmed by the firms' conduct.
INTRODUCTION
Empirically, researchers have found large unexplained capital market losses to firms involved in "negative" incidents. Implicitly and explicitly many authors attribute these residual losses to attrition of reputational capital, often for lack of another explanation. Theoretical models of reputation describe retaliation or punishment by a firm's contractual partners when the firm deviates from: an implicit agreement on quality of its product (by consumers); a profitmaximizing strategy (by shareholders); an implicit labor contract (by employees); or an implicit purchasing agreement (by suppliers). However, some of the authors of the original event studies (and those commenting on them) also imply that reputation may include punishment by the firm's contractual partners for harm done to others. Mainstream theoretical models of reputational mechanisms do not predict that one group will punish when another group is harmed. (Unless the group doing the punishing expects a positive probability of being harmed if the firm's devious behavior continues, punishment requires that the harmed group's well being enter the punishing group's utility functions.)
The factors driving the unexpected results of previous event studies are yet to be explained.
Policy decisions and academic questions depend on correctly identifying the situations in which reputational mechanisms are present. This paper provides evidence that reputational mechanisms are a plausible explanation of the unexplained residual losses, when reputation is defined traditionally -that is, only those who are (potentially) harmed incur the costs of punishment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I contains an overview of previous event studies that relate to the question of reputation effects. Section II includes an explanation of these past results within the traditional models of reputation and reviews examples from the academic literature and popular press of the widespread assumption that a firm's social reputation affects its capital market value. We outline an empirical test of this assertion. Section IV includes a discussion of the empirical procedure and the data. Finally, Section V presents the empirical results and conclusions.
I. UNEXPLAINED PAST EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Unexplained losses have been found in a variety of previous event studies 1 designed to measure the effect (and effectiveness) of regulation on a firm or industry 2 , and more recently, the effect of an even wider variety of nonregulatory events. Among the regulatory event studies, significant capital market losses are associated with firms' involvement in Federal Trade
Commission censures for false and deceptive advertising (Peltzman (1981) and Mathios and Plummer (1989) ), government-ordered drug, automobile, and other product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) , Hoffer, et al. (1988) , Rubin, et al. (1988), and Bosch and Lee (1994) ), other product-safety-related regulatory (and private) actions (Viscusi and Hersch (1990) ), Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) violations (Hersch (1991)), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations (Davidson, et al. (1989) and Fry and Lee (1989) ), and corporate crimes such as fraud and price fixing (Cloninger, et al. (1988) , Karpoff and Lott (1993) , and Reichert, et al. (1996) ).
1 Section IV contains an overview of the methodology for readers unfamiliar with the procedure. 2 See Schwert (1981) for an overview Nonregulatory events also lead to large and often unexplained losses. These include the changing of a product's formula (Benjamin and Mitchell, undated manuscript) , the Tylenol poisonings (Mitchell (1989) and Dowdell, et al. (1992) ), and airline crashes (Mitchell and Maloney (1989) and Chalk (1987) ). While these studies show the negative effects of a bad reputation, one study provides evidence that good reputations can increase a firm's value.
Chauvin and Guthrie (1994) found that firms experienced a statistically significant average gain in market value from appearing on Working Mother magazine's list of "best" employers.
In most of these studies the monetary losses to stockholders are shown to significantly outweigh the direct and estimated indirect costs of the incidents. These results are surprising to many authors. Peltzman (1981) characterized his findings as "amazing" and "… a mystery" (at 418), while Rubin, et al. (1988) label their extremely significant findings "surprisingly large" (at 37). For lack of a better explanation many authors characterize the residual losses (above and beyond explainable costs) as losses of reputation or goodwill. Dowdell, et al. (1992) , Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) , and Rubin, et al (1988) characterized the excess losses in their studies as losses of a firm's goodwill. Mitchell and Maloney (1989) dubbed their residual losses a "brand name effect".
Previous event studies involving environmental events show mixed results. Muoghalu, et al. (1990) found that in hazardous waste lawsuits that allege damages from improper hazardous waste disposal, defendant firms suffered significant losses. However, Harper and Adams (1996) found that the average market reaction of a firm's stock upon being named a potentially liable party in a Superfund cleanup effort was not significantly different from zero. Laplante and Lanoie (1994) found that for negative environmental events reported in the media, Canadianowned firms did not experience significant declines in stock market value either when an environmental violation was announced or when a lawsuit was filed. This is consistent with the small average penalty paid. The authors found that significant market adjustment occurred only after a suit settlement was announced. It is not known if the firms experienced residual losses.
Karpoff, Lott, and Rankine (1998) found a statistically significant average loss of 0.85 percent to firms involved in negative environmental incidents. The average loss was greater for events where initial press reports of the incident occurred either at the allegation date or the date charges were filed. However, when comparing these figures with the direct costs of the incidents, the authors found no evidence that any part of this loss could be attributed to reputation effects.
Hamilton (1995) investigated the stock market effects of information releases concerning a firm's pollution activities. Manufacturing facilities must report annual releases of chemicals to the EPA. This information is relayed to the public in a database called the Toxics Releases
Inventory (TRI). Hamilton studied both how the media treated TRI information and what affects it had on stock prices of polluting firms. He found that on the day of the information release, firms suffered, on average, a statistically significant drop in capital market value. This loss was higher the greater the number of chemicals per facility. Capital market losses were also positively correlated with number of Superfund sites. Hamilton's explanatory regressions suggested that potential liability and other direct monetary exposure issues, rather than consumer forces, drove these losses.
Finally, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) reported that Union Carbide took a 27.9 percent, or approximately $1 billion, hit from the Bhopal chemical leak, while its industry rivals suffered an average 1.28 percent loss in capital market value. The authors attributed these losses to investors' revisions of possible production-side risks and increased regulatory exposure. A summary of these event studies is presented in Table 1 .
II. EXPLAINING PAST EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Traditional Theories of Reputation
Some of the studies reviewed in Section I attempt to explain their estimated capital market losses by regressing them on study-specific potential explanatory factors. Others offer ad hoc explanations of possible factors affecting the magnitude of losses. However, none attempts to formally model the reputational mechanism at work when the authors refer to "reputation effects".
Traditional theories of reputational mechanisms have their roots in the concepts that are articulated in Akerlof (1970) , Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , Klein and Leffler (1981) , Nelson (1970) , and Nelson (1974) , and are modeled formally in Shapiro (1983) . Akerlof (1970) notes that in some situations of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers, mutually beneficial trades may be precluded by the prospects of cheating. Subsequently, economists began describing and modeling the methods that have evolved in such markets to mitigate 3 this problem. In particular, firms often use reputation to guarantee product quality. Klein, et al. (1978) first suggested that potential cheaters might offer a forfeitable hostage to guarantee performance in interfirm contracting. Klein and Leffler (1981) applied this concept to the consumer-producer relationship. High prices signal high quality, but consumers pay these prices only if they receive some guarantee of high quality. Producers of high quality goods make firm-specific investments that are forfeited if consumers discontinue purchases of the firm's output. Consumers realize that firms are unlikely to deviate from high quality because continued high quality production allows them to recoup their investments in "hostages" 4 .
Thus, if a firm deviates from a quality commitment (or even if an incident occurs that signals without one-hundred-percent certainty that the firm has deviated), customers punish the firm by lowering their willingness to pay. The net present value of the future profit stream declines and the capital market value of the firm falls. 5 These notions of stochastic and nonstochastic signals of deviations from prior commitments can be generalized to include the firm's reputation with its other contractual partners, namely its employees and suppliers. If a firm cheats in some way on a commitment it has to a supplier, the firm is likely to incur higher input costs in the future.
Firms that cheat their employees may face wage premiums to attract future workers in a competitive labor market.
Finally, firms also have reputations with investors. A firm's involvement in a negative incident may lead investors to reevaluate their faith that the firm's management will steer clear of such costly events in the future. Investors may also revise their subjective probabilities of tighter future regulatory scrutiny or additional regulations. The higher the perceived risk of such consequences, the lower the firm's expected future profit stream, and the lower the share price.
In summary, the comments concerning the findings of previous event studies, framed in the theory of reputation, suggest that "reputation effects" are transmitted several ways.
(1) The incident may result in a downgrading of the firm's reputation with its customers, employees, or suppliers. Depending on the nature of the implicit commitment, this loss of reputation may result from (a) a deviation from expected behavior (in a nonstochastic setting), or (b) consumers', employees', or suppliers' revision of their estimates of the probability that the firm has cheated (in a stochastic setting).
(2) The firm also may suffer capital market losses if the event leads to decreased faith in the firm's management on the part of investors. This may be the result of (a) perceived increased risk of future incidents, and/or perceived increased regulatory exposure.
While these reputational factors are reasonable partial explanations of observed residual losses, they are incomplete interpretations for at least two reasons. First, no empirical evidence exists to show that a combination of (1) direct costs, (2) consumers' response to deviations from expected product quality, (3) employees' response to deviations from implicit employment contracts, (4) suppliers' reactions to deviations from implicit purchasing agreements, and (5) investors' decreased faith in management explain all of the losses reported in empirical studies.
In fact, both Peltzman's work, (1981) and Peltzman's and others' comments suggest otherwise.
Second, suggestions of the importance of social reputation in explaining these residual losses are pervasive in the literature. That is, it is widely suggested that the firms' contractual partners punish firms for harm done to others. Without a unified model of reputation (consistent with the stylized facts), the social reputation hypotheses, while not compatible with economic theory, continues to carry as much weight as the other ad hoc explanations of residual losses.
The (Conjectured) Social Component of Reputation
The foundations of the case for social reputation are found in suggestions and anecdotes in the literature and also in the results of experimental economics. Many of the original event studies' authors suggest that a firm's social reputation can affect sales 6 . Some quotes are more direct. Hersch (1991) suggests that in the aftermath of an EEO violation "costs include … adverse publicity that might result in the loss of sales …" (at 140). Muoghalu, et al. (1990) , in reference to residual losses suffered by firms involved in Superfund cases, state that "stockholder losses … include … public ill-will resulting from the lawsuit or the dumping" (at 358, note 5).
Hanka (1992) noted that "image-conscious firms fear the reputation consequences of pollution"
(at 26). Davidson, et al. (1994) attribute some of the significant losses subsequent to OSHA violations to "negative publicity for the firm".
These comments suggest that consumers, employees, or suppliers 7 punish firms for engaging in practices that are "socially irresponsible". The losses suffered from this type of retaliation would be in addition to other direct and indirect costs of the incident, including the reputational losses for failing to honor implicit contracts with consumers, employees, or suppliers, and any losses from decreased faith in management. Thus, such punishments would create the unexplained "goodwill" or "reputation" effects.
These types of comments cover not only the negative effects of a bad reputation, but also the positive effects of a good social reputation. Chauvin and Guthrie (1994) state "… if investors believe that customers will prefer purchasing goods and services from 'good' employers, [the positive returns to firms on Working Mother's "best employer" list] may also reflect estimates of the effect that labor market reputation may have on sales" (at 551). Schwartz (1968) states that "(g)ifts which enhance the public image of a corporation can advantageously shift the demand curve for the corporation's product" (at 480). Navarro (1988) concluded that giving to charity increases demand or decreases demand elasticity for a firm's product(s). Analogously, the tarnishing of a firm's image could decrease demand or increase demand elasticity for a firm's product(s).
Making the "social reputation" case even stronger is the anecdotal evidence that suggests that customers gain utility and disutility from characteristics of firms' production and financing processes. Consumers readily purchase recycled products (such as notebook paper and paper towels) which function no better than nonrecycled paper products, yet command price premiums.
Investors put money in socially conscious mutual funds that pay lower returns for the risk than their socially-disinterested counterparts. Rothchild (1996) firm's expenditures on the environment or "fairness" in hiring practices, appointment of environmentalists to boards of directors, and emphasis in stockholder reports on politically correct firm policies suggest that firms reap some reward from consumer or investor knowledge of these practices. Arguably, such practices do not improve the efficiency of the actual production process, but, because they are common practice, firms must expect that they add to profits. A spokesman for Reebok International Ltd. claims "[m]ore and more in the marketplace, … who you are and what you stand for is as important as the quality of the product you sell"
(Hayes and Pereira, 1990, at B1).
Adding to the fervor of these suggestions of social reputation are experimental economists'
reports of evidence of widespread principle-based behavior in laboratory tests 9 and behavioral models in the literature which are generated to be compatible with these experimental results 10 .
III. TESTING FOR EVIDENCE OF A SOCIAL REPUTATION EFFECT
Both the formal definitions of reputation in the literature (see, for example Shapiro (1982) ) and the formal discussions in the above event studies assert that "reputation effects" refer only to the reputation of a firm's output in the goods market, its reputation for its dealings with its employees or suppliers, and its management's reputation in the capital market 11 . However, the informal discussion suggests that social reputation affects profit. These assertions have significant consequences. Voters, regulators, and taxpayers make assumptions concerning retaliatory behavior trends when voting for (or otherwise affecting) government involvement in markets. For example, Karpoff, et al. (1998) note that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is 8 Hayes and Pereira (1990) 9 See, for example, Camerer and Thaler (1995) and Kahneman, et al. (1986) in which players are willing to sacrifice money to reward players who are kind to others in previous rounds and punish those who were previously unfair to their opponents. 10 See, for example, Bolton (1991) in which relative payoffs matter and Rabin (1993) which allows for agents to reward those who are kind and punish those who are unkind. 11 Chauvin and Guthrie (1994) note that "… in all theoretical work on reputations, reputations have economic value because they improve the efficiency of markets…" (at 546). Schwartz (1968) notes that "(h)istorically, economists have tended to ignore private philanthropic behavior and to regard it as economically irrational" (at 479).
explicitly considering the existence of reputational effects from environmental incidents in setting its sentencing guidelines for corporate environmental crimes.
The goal of the empirical section of this paper is to test whether, as copious comments suggest, social reputations are a factor in the unexplained losses of previous event studies. Our procedure is to test for residual losses to firms involved in negative events that do not harm the firm's contractual partners (except through direct losses from the incident), but do affect their social reputation by harming third-parties. Negative environmental incidents represent such events.
We employ standard event study methodology to determine the effect that a negative environmental event has on the market value of a firm. Under an assumption of efficient markets, capital market participants produce an unbiased estimate of the value of a firm reflecting all available information. A firm's abnormal return 12 immediately following the release of news concerning the firm is the market's unbiased estimate of the costs (or benefits) of the news.
Thus, we calculate and analyze abnormal returns to firms involved in negative environmental incidents. Absence of residual losses suggests that agents do not punish firms for harm done to others, while presence of significant residual losses suggests that measurable reputation effects may result from deterioration of social reputation. If residual losses to such events are found, it will remain to be shown that these losses represent punishment for social reputation, and not, for example, a measurement problem common to all event studies. As such, we conjecture that consumers' propensities to punish decrease as the cost of punishment increases, but a measurement error or other extraneous factor should not vary with costs of punishment.
Therefore, we prepare to test any residual losses for social reputation effects by collecting a sample of environmental mishaps caused by electric power companies and oil companies. The utilities represent an industry with few substitutes (where punishment would be expensive and, therefore, less likely), while the oil companies represent an industry with many close substitutes (where punishment would be relatively cheaper, and, thus, more likely). Finally, we perform a cross-sectional analysis of the observed abnormal returns.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND PROCEDURE
The Event Study Data and Methodology
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A list of potential events was drawn from all negative environmental events suffered by oil concerns and electric utilities between 1970 14 and 1992 15 as reported in The Wall Street Journal Index. Potential events had to meet three criteria. First, the event must have had a negative environmental impact as the result of the actions of an oil division or electric power producing division of the firm. This is because, if consumers were distressed upon hearing of pollution by Acme Chemical, but were unaware that Acme was a subsidiary of ABC Oil Co., they would be unable to punish, if they were so inclined. Second, the event must not have affected the quality of the firm's physical product. For example, some oil firms have been charged with switching leaded and unleaded fuel. Using the wrong type of fuel not only causes pollution, but also inflicts costly damage to a car's engine and exhaust system. In such cases, consumers' material self-interest would lead to decreased demand; retaliation for any resulting pollution could not be separated 16 . Third, because all of our stock returns data are from the CRSP tapes 17 , the target firm's returns must be available on the CRSP tapes for the entire estimation period and event window.
We use as our event date, the day that news of the event appears in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), unless the report suggests a more appropriate date. When picking our event dates, we carefully considered the fact that if WSJ announcement dates are used as event dates when they do not correspond to the date of the precipitating incident, the market may have adjusted to news of the incident before the event date, consequently biasing announcement date losses downward.
The information to which market participants are most likely to react is not always the precipitating incident. The market reaction to an announcement of an investigation that has a 5% chance of resulting in a $1M fine will be much different that the reaction to the commencement of an investigation that has a 95% probability of resulting in a $1M fine. The best option is to use the date most likely to contain the bulk of the market adjustment to the "event". If the event were of the former type, this would be at the time of the precipitating incident. If the event were of the latter type, this would be at the time that news that an actual loss will occur (or, possibly, is more likely) reaches the market.
The WSJ announcement date is the appropriate event date for our study for three reasons.
First, there is precedent for using this methodology. Many event studies have used the WSJ announcement date as the event date. Secondly, most of the other studies with which we are comparing our results employ this methodology. To allow meaningful comparisons of our results with past studies' results, we follow comparable procedures. The third reason is that we feel the WSJ gets it right most of the time. That is, the Journal's report of news that affects the firms are mentioned in the financial news on an almost-daily basis, we left all events with concurrent news in the sample to get as much information as possible. However, we calculated the results for various subsets of events, depending on the nature of the concurrent news.
market is reasonably accurate and timely. At a minimum, there is enough uncertainty left when the WSJ publishes a news story that the information is still novel. Helmuth, et al. (1994) found significant market reaction to corrections printed in the WSJ.
Firms realized significantly positive returns on the day that corrections representing "good news"
were reported, and suffered significant losses when corrections representing "bad news" were printed. Further, there was no post-event rebound of value. As the authors note, these results imply that the "corrections are at least partially unanticipated by the market" suggesting "that a subset of market participants depend on the WSJ for financial information."
The results of previous event studies (particularly previous environmental event studies), and the seemingly-random actions of the EPA and environmental groups, suggest that being implicated in an environmental incident often is associated with a low probability of further action or concern. Karpoff, Lott, and Rankine (1998), at 25, conclude that penalties stemming from environmental incidents are highly variable and not easy to predict. Thus, news of many potential events is unlikely to be printed until some official action is taken. However, some events (e.g. Valdez and Three-Mile Island) seem highly likely to generate further costs (and, thus, were reported very close to the precipitating incident date) 18 .
The final sample of 98 events is summarized in Table A -1 of the appendix. Included are the name of the firm, a description of the event, the date that news of the event first appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and any other firm-specific news reported in the Journal on the days surrounding the event.
17 The CRSP tapes are a database of stock prices and other securities information administered by the Center for Research in Stock Prices at the University of Chicago.
Our goal is to identify the firms' abnormal returns from these negative environmental incidents. The abnormal return to a firm from the event is the difference between the firm's actual return and the return we would expect for the firm in the absence of the incident. We employ the market model to obtain parameters for generating expected returns. Specifically, for each event, using returns for days just prior to the event date, we obtain an OLS estimate of:
where RET it ≡ the percentage return to the target firm of event i at date t, MRET t ≡ the percentage return at time t to the NYSE/AMEX value-weighted portfolio, and e it is random disturbance to the event i target firm's return at date t. For each event, the e t are distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviation of σ i 2 .
Accordingly, α is a constant and β is the systematic risk of firm i's stock over the estimation period (beta in the CAPM model). Time is indexed t, such that t=0 on the event date.
The timespan used to estimate α and β is referred to as the estimation period. We calculate expected returns using the 199 days immediately prior to the event date. The resulting estimates of α i and β i , denoted a i and b i respectively, are used to calculate expected returns to the target firm of event i around the event date. The difference between the actual return on any day and the expected return calculated for that day (the prediction error) is the day's abnormal return:
where AR it is the abnormal return to the target firm of event i on day t.
The average abnormal return to the entire sample on any day t, denoted AAR t , is the average of the abnormal returns on day t for each event in the sample:
where n is the number of firms in the sample.
The time span over which the market is assumed to fully adjust to news of the event is called the event window. The abnormal return to the firm accumulated over this adjustment period is our best estimate of losses (or gains) to the firm from the event 19 . This measure is called the cumulative abnormal return. For a given event window [e.g. the event window consisting of days t=-1 and t=0, denoted (-1,0)], the cumulative abnormal return for event i, denoted CAR i , is defined as the sum of the abnormal returns for each day in the event window:
where a ≡ the first day in i's event window, and b ≡ the last day in i's event window.
For any given event window [e.g. the (-1,0) window], the average cumulative abnormal return to the full sample, ACAR, is the average over the sample of each CAR i : 19 We assume that the market reacts immediately to news of the event. However, because it was unclear for many of our events whether this news reached the market before 4:00 p.m. on the day before it appeared in the Journal, we use the (-1,0) event window. For comparison, we also calculate results for the day t=-1, day t=0, day t=1, and the (-5,0), and (-1,9) windows. 
AR CAR
For a given event window, the total monetary loss to the firm's shareholders (in dollars) from the event is simply the product of the firm's CAR and the value of the firm's shares outstanding on the day t=-2.
Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Event Study Results
After we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns to each event, we investigate the factors contributing to these observed abnormal returns. The (-1,0) window CARs for all events are regressed on event-specific explanatory variables in an attempt to identify other causal factors that may explain the event study results. The first explanatory variable is report type. This is a proxy for how novel the news reported on the event date is to market participants. The second explanatory variable, action type, accounts for the possibility that different types of accusers impose different costs on polluters.
The third explanatory variable is concurrent news. Events are categorized by type of concurrent news in the (-1,0,1) window. The concurrent news on day t=1 is included since this news may have reached the market on day t=0. Inclusion of the concurrent news variable will net out any biasing effects of other firm-specific news in the event window. The fourth explanatory variable is time. It may proxy for environmental consciousness and regulatory and/or prosecutorial fervor in the environmental sector. In an alternative specification we dummy for presidential administration. 
V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 20
The CARs for the (-1,0) window for each of the 98 events are presented in Table A-2 When all events are considered, the ACAR to the full sample for the (-1,0) window is positive. Additionally, there are eight significantly positive CARs. These results are counterintuitive, because, even if reputation effects are not present, there are direct costs to the incidents. Four events for which the target firm had significantly positive abnormal returns on either day t=-1, day t=0, or in the (-1,0) window also had "good" firm-specific news in the event window (events 39, 59, 72, and 82). In addition, four more events (#18, 19, 20, and 21) shared an event date on which Mideast tensions threatened to delay a possible loosening of oil importing restrictions by President Nixon. Three of these CARs are significantly positive. Only one event with bad news in the window (#13) produced a significantly negative abnormal return on t=-1or t=0 or in the (-1,0) window. Removal of these nine (possibly biasing) events from the sample yields an insignificant 0.25 percent, or $882,000, average loss to the remainder of the sample. When the 34 events with any concurrent firm-specific news in the event window (good, 20 A subset of fourteen events was used to test the effect of different combinations of estimation period (150-day or 200-day) and market return calculation (equally-weighted or value-weighted) specifications on the predictive power of the market model. No one measure or class of measures produced a significantly higher correlation between targets' returns and market returns. The subsample was also used to determine whether either a procedure to net out bad, or neutral) are excluded, the average cumulative abnormal return is an insignificant 0.016 percent gain 21 . These figures represent gross losses. Residual losses were not calculated since the ACAR is insignificant. That is, netting out the losses due to direct costs can only make an individual event's return a larger (less negative) number. Thus the ACAR, net of direct costs, cannot be significantly lees than zero.
In the full sample results, the t=-1 and t=0 windows show a significantly negative and a significantly positive AAR, respectively. However, this result appears to be driven by one unusual incident. Event 9 involves a radiation leak scare at a Rochester Gas and Electric plant only a few years after Three Mile Island. At first news of the incident (t=-1), a mass sell-off resulted in a 13.5 percent drop in the firm's value. However, when more information was released the following day (t=0), the stock gained back almost nine percent (and the stock's price was back to its pre-event level within five trading days). When event 9 is removed from the full sample (and each of our subsamples), the average returns in the t=-1 and t=0 windows are no longer significantly different from zero. With or without event 9, the ACAR for the (-1,0) window is insignificant, because the two days' reactions tend to cancel each other out.
Insignificant average cumulative abnormal returns in the (-5,0) window and (-1,9) window suggest that the stock market's adjustment to the event did not occur outside of the (-1,0) event window. The insignificant (-5,0) window suggests that news of the event did not reach the market just prior to the report date, while the insignificant (-1,9) window suggests that adjustment to the new news did not occur with a lag.
the effects of industry-wide increased regulatory scrutiny or a procedure to net out the residual losses due to decreased faith in management was warranted for the full sample. Neither was found to be of significant benefit. 21 Additionally, when events 18 and 20 are removed, the (-1,0) ACAR is an insignificant 0.232 percent loss.
Explanatory Regression Results
Our event study results suggest that abnormal returns to firms involved in negative environmental events are random and average approximately zero. Compared to event studies of other negative events that employ a similar methodology, we find a much smaller effect from negative environmental incidents. To test whether some causal variable(s) could explain the variation of CARs over the different firms and incidents, we regress the observed cumulative abnormal returns for the (-1,0) window on explanatory variables for report type, action type, concurrent news type, time, industry, and firm size.
Consistent with our event study results, our explanatory regression results also suggest that abnormal returns to firms are random and can be explained as white noise. The adjusted R 2 is 0.0605 and none of the regressors has explanatory power at a significance level of 0.20 or lower.
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.8962 and a plot of the regression residuals appears normal.
Two alternate specifications were tested. First, because categorizing type of news in the event window is a somewhat arbitrary choice on the part of the researcher, we test if the results are robust to classifying events as having either no news in the window or any news (good, bad, or neutral) in the window. In the second alternative specification, we dummy for presidential administration instead of employing the time variable. The alternative specifications also have very little explanatory power and yield intercept and slope coefficients that are not significant.
The insignificance of the report type variables suggests that use of event dates postdating the initial incident date does not significantly bias the sample average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) upward. This is accentuated by the fact that 70 events with first news at the time of the charge are being compared to only 18 events (including both the Valdez spill and Three Mile Island) with first news at the time of the precipitating incident. The insignificance of the coefficient on the dummy for industry suggests that oil and electric firms do not have significantly different market reactions due to regulatory or thin-trading issues. Estimated intercepts and slope coefficients for each specification, along with corresponding t-statistics, are reported in Table 3 .
If, as some authors have suggested, there were a reputational penalty to negative environmental events, we would expect to find significantly negative residual losses in our study.
Instead, the cumulative abnormal returns appear to be random. In keeping with the standard models of reputation, we find no evidence of a negative reputation effect.
Our results are consistent with Harper and Adams's (1996) finding that firms experienced insignificant changes in value upon being named a potentially responsible party in a Superfund cleanup. They are also consistent with Laplante and Lanoie's (1994) finding that Canadian firms did not experience significant losses from announcements of environmental violations or lawsuits. Our results, however, extend this finding of insignificant 22 market losses in environmental event studies to a broader class of regulatory as well as nonregulatory events.
Our results are also consistent with the assertions and findings of Karpoff, et al. (1998) that formal penalties for committing environmental crimes are random and that stockholders realize this. Because our sample covers a period twice as long as Karpoff, et al.'s, (1970 Karpoff, et al.'s, ( through 1992 versus 1980 through 1991) we can be confident that their findings are not merely a figment of, for example, the "80's mentality", but span several decades and presidential administrations.
22 Muoghalu, et al. (1990) unsurprisingly found significant gross losses because they considered only a specific type of environmental incident that had (potentially large) direct costs. The authors did not report residual losses (net of direct costs), so reputation effects are not known. Hamilton (1995) found that firms suffered significant losses when information about chemical releases at their facilities was made public. However, in the author's explanatory regressions, losses increased with number of chemicals at a facility but not with level of emissions, indicating potential future liability was more important than extent of current harm. Also, number of Superfund sites was
Conclusions
We find an overall insignificant stock market response to a sample consisting of all negative environmental incidents (regulatory and nonregulatory) reported in the Wall Street Journal over the 1970 to 1992 period involving oil firms and electric power companies with listed stocks.
Thus, our results suggest that other researchers' findings of insignificant reputation effects from regulatory environmental events extend to a wider class of regulatory and nonregulatory incidents than previously has been considered in the literature. These events affect firms' social reputations, but not the quality of their output or their reputations with employees or suppliers.
Thus, our findings contradict the widely-asserted hypothesis that when firms develop negative social reputations (that is, negative reputations from harming third parties), their unaffected contractual partners will incur the costs of punishment. Rather, our findings affirm the traditional models of reputational mechanisms, which are effective when harms and punishments are limited to contractual partners. Moreover, our findings provide evidence that the large losses from harmful events are in fact due to stock market expectations that contractual partners will punish firms for imposing direct harms.
associated with increased loss, but extent of media coverage had an insignificant effect, again indicating that response to potential risk exposure outweighed reactions to the firms' social reputation and goodwill. 
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